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international vector autoregression. Using high-frequency data on the prices of Fed Funds futures
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The role of monetary policy in explaining the dynamics and volatility of exchange rates is
a central theme in empirical international ﬁnance. The current predominant approach to
identifying structural monetary policy shocks, in both closed- and open-economy settings,
involves using a vector autoregression (VAR). This approach relies on making identifying
assumptions relating structural shocks to the reduced form errors of the VAR. While many
identiﬁcation approaches have been proposed for identifying VARs, most often short-run
restrictions are used. These specify that some structural shock has no contemporaneous
eﬀect on one or more variables. In an open-economy setting, such identifying assumptions
are used by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000), and Kim (2001).
Identiﬁcation of structural monetary policy shocks in VARs is contentious because, as
the authors generally acknowledge, there are few highly credible identifying assumptions.
Open economy VAR applications raise particularly thorny simultaneity issues. For example,
most closed economy applications involve a single ﬁnancial market variable, a short-term
interest rate; long-term rates are generally excluded due to the identiﬁcation problems that
arise when they are included.1 To be minimally credible, the open economy analogs must
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1See Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) for a thorough description of this issue and examples of VARs with
1include 3 ﬁnancial market variables: a short-rate in each country and the exchange rate.
Satisfactory identifying restrictions for sorting out the contemporaneous movements of these
variables simply have not been found. For example, some papers assume that U.S. monetary
policy shocks have no eﬀect on foreign interest rates until a month after the policy move
(Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000)). This is at odds with the fact that
foreign central banks regularly change policy in the wake of Federal Reserve policy decisions.
Other authors assume that the Fed ignores any surprise movements in exchange rates and/or
short-term interest rates that have occurred during the month in which decisions on the
policy variable are made (Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Kim and Roubini (2000)).
If true, these assumptions would call into question why the Federal Reserve Board staﬀ
invest tremendous eﬀort in providing the Board with minute-by-minute information about
surprising movements in ﬁnancial markets.
Aware that the assumptions are not entirely credible, authors typically discuss results
from a few alternative identiﬁcations, indicating that the published results are robust to
changes. Such robustness checks are of course indispensable. Nonetheless, in cases where
the alternatives identiﬁcations are each recursive a sense of dissatisfaction lingers since we
expect simultaneity among asset market variables.
Motivated by these considerations, Faust and Rogers (2002) apply an approach to
identiﬁcation, originally developed by Faust (1998). This is an approach that allows one to
long and short rates.
2do inference in partially identiﬁed models. Using such methods, one can test whether the
answers to key questions are robust to dropping implausible identifying assumptions. Us-
ing a standard open-economy VAR, Faust and Rogers ﬁnd that some key results are highly
sensitive to the assumed recursive structure of money market variables, while other results
are robust. For example, the “delayed overshooting” response of the nominal exchange rate
commonly found under the assumption that foreign interest rates do not respond contem-
poraneously to U.S. monetary policy shocks vanishes when even a slight response of foreign
rates is allowed. On the other hand, the assumption that monetary policy shocks generate
large deviations from uncovered interest rate parity is not sensitive to loosening the recursive
structure.
The approach of Faust and Rogers can show which answers are sensitive to allow-
ing simultaneity among ﬁnancial market variables. When sensitivity is found, additional
identifying information is needed to sharpen our inferences.
In this paper, we bring high frequency ﬁnancial market data to bear in identifying the
monetary policy shock following the approach of Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2002a). We
assume that the change in the Fed Funds target rate on the days of Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meetings that was not anticipated by futures markets represents a
monetary policy shock. We then regress changes in exchange rates and spot and future
interest rates in a narrow window around the FOMC decision on the surprise change in the
target rate, and then impose that the impulse responses of the exchange rate and U.S. and
3foreign short-term interest rates in a standard open-economy VAR match the responses we
have estimated from the high frequency ﬁnancial market data.
Our key results are these:
1. Most of the impulse responses of the system to U.S. policy shocks under the new
identiﬁcation are consistent with those from the recursive identiﬁcation. However, the
eﬀect of the U.S. policy shock on foreign output and interest rates lasts longer than
with the recursive identiﬁcation. The price puzzle in the recursive identiﬁcation is
avoided with the new identiﬁcation. For Germany, we formally reject the recursive
identiﬁcation, but not for the UK.
2. The peak timing of the exchange rate response is imprecisely estimated as in Faust and
Rogers (2002). Whereas the recursive identiﬁcation suggests strong evidence of delayed
overshooting, the conﬁdence interval for the peak timing in the new identiﬁcation
includes immediate peaks and delay of several years.
3. All the approaches agree that monetary policy shocks generate large UIP deviations.
The movements of the exchange rate following U.S. policy shocks do not seem to be
driven by UIP.
4. The conﬁdence interval for the variance share of the exchange rate due to the policy
shock in the new identiﬁcation is somewhat larger than in the recursive identiﬁcation,
but is bounded by about 1/3. This is somewhat tighter than the estimates of Faust
4and Rogers, reﬂecting the fact that additional information has been brought to bear.
Other authors have also used high frequency ﬁnancial market data to help identify the
monetary policy shock in an otherwise conventional VAR. Bagliano and Favero (1999) take
am o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c ki d e n t i ﬁed by interest rate moves around policy decisions and use it
to identify the eﬀects of a policy shock in closed and open economy VARs. Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2002) use a similar approach in a closed economy VAR. The primary diﬀerence in
our method is that we also exploit futures market data and high-frequency spot exchange
rate data. In particular, we require that the VAR replicate the eﬀect of the policy shock
on expected future home and foreign rates as measured from futures markets and spot
exchange rates. We also focus on a diﬀerent set of questions–exchange rate eﬀects of U.S.
policy shocks–than these other papers.
Section 2 discusses the approach to identiﬁcation. Section 3 presents our approach and
results from the high frequency data exercise.. Section 4 contains the VAR results. Section
5 contains some tests of our identifying assumptions, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Identiﬁcation
2.1 The simplest case
Consider the reduced form VAR,
A(L)Yt = ut (1)
5where Yt is G × 1, A(L)=Σ∞
j=0AjLj and A0 = I. F o l l o w i n gt h el i t e r a t u r ew ea s s u m et h a t
A(L) is invertible so that the system can be written as,
Yt = B(L)ut (2)
where B(L)=A(L)−1.
The identiﬁed VAR literature makes the assumption that the G reduced form errors
ut are related to structural errors εt by the relation: ut = Sεt,w h e r eS is full rank. One of
the structural shocks is assumed to be the monetary policy shock of interest. We can order
things such that this is the ﬁrst structural shock. The VAR can be written in terms of the
structural shocks as,
Yt = B(L)Sεt (3)
Call the ﬁrst column of S, α; this is the column corresponding to the policy shock. The






This is a G × 1 vector of lag polynomials and the coeﬃcients of the gth element trace out
t h er e s p o n s eo ft h egth variable to the policy shock.
The Bs are given by the reduced form estimates and so identifying the impulse response
requires picking the G elements of α. One restriction is a normalization, choosing the sign
and units of the policy shock. In most work, one normalizes the standard deviation of the
6shock to be 1. In our work, the VAR includes the 3-month eurodollar interest rate and we
normalize the shock to have a contemporaneous -25 basis point eﬀect on this interest rate.2
We complete the identiﬁcation by requiring that certain impulse responses match values
given from the high frequency data. For this section, simply take it as given that we have
some restrictions saying that the impulse response of the jth variable to the policy shock at
lag h is rjh. This restriction can be written,
Bh:jα = rjh (4)
where Bh:j is the jth row of Bh.I fw eh a v eG such restrictions, we can stack them to form
Rα = r
Clearly, if R and r are taken as known and R is full rank, α is uniquely identiﬁed as R−1r.
2.2 Factors complicating inference
In the above discussion, we treated R and r as known. In practice R will be implied by the
reduced form estimates of the VAR and r will be estimated from the futures market data.
We must take account of uncertainty in each when doing our inference. More problemati-
cally, full identiﬁcation rests on the condition that R is of rank G. W h e nw et e s tt h er a n k
2The choice of normalizing the impact eﬀect or the standard deviation of the shock is innocuous in the
point estimates. Suppose a one standard deviation shock has a -25 basis point eﬀect in the point estimates.
A 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the eﬀects of a one standard deviation shock need not be a 95 percent
conﬁdence interval for a 25 basis point shock. This is because the impact eﬀect of a one standard deviation
shock is stochastic. Our normalization is chosen for two reasons. It is technically convenient, and it leads to
conﬁdence intervals for something we want to learn: the eﬀects of a given size. We are less interested in the
eﬀects of a 1 standard deviation shock, where the value of the standard deviation is not stipulated.
7of our estimated Rsb e l o w ,w ec a n n o tr e j e c tr a n kd e ﬁciency. We discuss reasons for this
below. Thus our restrictions Rα = r leave the system only partially identiﬁed–some linear
combinations of α may be well identiﬁe dw h i l eo t h e r sa r en o t . W em u s tu s em e t h o d sa p -
propriate for partially identiﬁed systems. An alternative would be to ﬁnd more restrictions.
We argue below that we are exploiting all the restrictions from high frequency data that we
could identify.
We take a classical approach to inference in partially identiﬁed systems. First, we
use economic reasoning to bound the magnitude of each element of α above and below.
Remember that the elements of α are the contemporaneous eﬀect of the policy shock on
each variable in the VAR and that we normalize the eﬀect on the short-rate in the U.S.
to 25 basis points. Thus, one can interpret our bounds as limits on the relative eﬀect on
other variables of a shock that lowers the U.S. interest rate by 25 basis points. We choose
bounds that are largely uncontroversial, but these limits remain a substantive part of the
identiﬁcation. It is important to note that several of these restrictions are strictly looser than
the restrictions imposed in recursive identiﬁcation. In that work, certain contemporaneous
responses are set to zero.
These bounds are required because conﬁdence intervals for linear functions of α (such
as structural impulse responses) would typically be unbounded when α is only partially
identiﬁed. Even with these bounds, the failure of the rank condition means that we must
give up on point estimation and only consider conﬁdence intervals constructed in a way that
8is robust to the failure of the rank condition.
2.3 Conﬁdence intervals under partial identiﬁcation
Suppose we want to learn about some scalar parameter f. This could be the share of the
forecast error variance of output at horizon 48 due to the policy shock or the impulse response
of prices to the policy shock at some horizon. Calling all the reduced form parameters of
the VAR θ, f is a function of θ and α: f(θ,α).
To form conﬁdence intervals for f, ﬁrst, we form a v1%c o n ﬁdence set for α by a method
that takes account of uncertainty in R and r and that does not rely on assumptions about
the rank of R. The construction of this conﬁdence set follows the work of Stock and Wright
(2000) and is discussed in detail in Appendix A1. Call this conﬁdence set A.3
For any ﬁxed α in A, we can use a conventional bootstrap to construct a v2%c o n ﬁdence
interval for f(θ,α). Let this conﬁdence interval be [c(α),¯ c(α)]. Next form the outer envelope
of all of these intervals across all αsi nA,a s[infαεA c(α),supαεA ¯ c(α)].T h i s c o n ﬁdence interval
has asymptotic coverage of at least v1 + v2 − 100%, from the Bonferroni inequality, because
asymptotically (i) the true α is included in A with probability v1%, and (ii) the bootstrap
conﬁdence interval has v2% coverage for any ﬁxed α. The technique is conservative in that
coverage may asymptotically be higher than v1 + v2 − 100%.4 The resulting conﬁdence
3We also form conﬁdence intervals reﬂecting uncertainty regarding α but not θ. Fixing θ at the re-
duced form point estimate ˆ θ,w ec a nﬁnd the range of f(ˆ θ,α) consistent with α in our conﬁdence set A:
[infαεA f(ˆ θ,α),supαεA f(ˆ θ,α)]. W ed on o tr e p o r tt h e s et os a v es p a c e . T h e ya r es u s t a n t i a l l ys m a l l e rt h a n
the conﬁdence intervals we report below.
4For example, even when the true α is not in A,t h ec o n ﬁdence interval may contain the true f.
9interval may be wide, reﬂecting in part its construction as a conservative conﬁdence interval
using the Bonferroni inequality. Henceforth in this paper, we set v1 =9 5and v2 =7 3
ensuring that the asymptotic coverage is at least 68%, a coverage rate commonly applied in
VAR work.
An alternative approach to inference in unidentiﬁed systems is provided by a Bayesian
framework. While the Bayesian approach might be simpler in some respects, the results
in underidentiﬁed systems may be highly sensitive to the prior, even in large samples. Our
classical conﬁdence intervals will (asymptotically) have at least the stated coverage so long as
t h eb o u n d sw ei m p o s eo nα are correct. Thus, so long as ones prior for α is not inconsistent
with our bounds, the stated results should be of interest.
3. High Frequency Asset Price Data and Impulse Responses to
Policy Shocks
This section develops the claim, taken as given in the last section, that some structural
impulse responses to a monetary policy shock can be measured from high frequency data
on interest rates, interest rate futures and exchange rates. Our method relies on several
important assumptions. These are to some degree testable and we present evidence in
support of the assumptions in section 5.
3.1 The principle assumptions
10Since February 1994, the FOMC has made a public announcement about its target for
the Federal Funds rate at 2:15pm Eastern time on each of its eight regularly scheduled
meeting dates every year. We follow Kuttner (2001) and other papers5 in assuming that the
unexpected change in the target rate in the FOMC announcement can be measured from
Federal Funds futures contracts (described precisely below) and that this unexpected target
change reﬂects an exogenous monetary policy shock. This assumption will fail, for example,
if the FOMC’s policy move at 2:15pm reveals private information of the Fed’s about the state
of the economy. In section 5, we discuss our tests of this assumption. This assumption does
not require that there are no policy shocks on other days–say, days the Chairman testiﬁes
in Congress.
For 3 variables in the VAR (domestic and foreign short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate), we have high frequency data. We estimate the contemporaneous eﬀect of
the policy shock on these variables by regressing the change in each variable in a narrow
window around the FOMC meeting on the unexpected change in the target rate at the
FOMC meeting, as measured from the Federal Funds futures market (which we henceforth
refer to as the FFT shock). We assume that the relative movements in these variables in
response to the FFT shock measure the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on these variables
in the VAR. We gain eﬃciency in estimating the contemporaneous eﬀects of the policy shock
5Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) use changes in the spot 30-day eurodollar interest rate around the FOMC
announcement instead.
11on other variables by picking the narrowest possible window around the policy shock.6
We gain 4 additional restrictions by assuming that we can measure the change in
expectations of future spot rates due to the policy shock from interest rate futures markets.
In particular, we use high frequency 3-month and 6-month futures data on the home and
foreign short rate. We take the change in the these rates due to the FFT shock in a narrow
window around the FOMC announcement as a measure of the eﬀect of the policy shock on
expected interest rates at the relevant horizon. In addition to the assumptions stated so far,
this step requires that risk premia embedded in the futures rates do not change over the
window of time when we measure the change. We test some implications of this assumption
below.
One might wonder why we do not use additional high frequency data in order to gain
f u r t h e rr e s t r i c t i o n s . W et h i n kw eh a v ee x p l o i t e dm u c ho ft h er e l e v a n td a t a . W eu s eh i g h
frequency data for every variable in the VAR that is measured at high frequency. There
are other futures or forward data for the interest rates and exchange rates in the VAR.
Unfortunately, our tests below indicate that the risk premia in these data appear to be too
variable to reliably treat these as measures of expectations.
3.2 Asset price data
The Federal Funds futures contract, traded on the CBOT, settles on the last day of the
6Picking the narrowest possible window for the left-hand side variables in this regression is purely a matter
of eﬃciency, not consistency.
12month for the average eﬀective Federal Funds rate over all days in that month. Following
Kuttner (2001), we measure the surprise change in the target Federal Funds rate on the
FOMC day by taking the diﬀerence between the closing price of the Federal Funds contract
that day (3:00pm Eastern time) and the closing price the previous day and multiplying this
change by days in month
days left in month.7 We would prefer to have the change in the Fed Funds futures
rate in a narrower window of time around the FOMC announcement (2:00pm-2:30pm), but
we have these data only for the last two years of the sample.
We have observations at 5 minute intervals for the sterling and the mark/euro exchange
rates against the dollar, obtained from Olsen Associates. We measure the change around
the FOMC announcement from 2:00pm and 2:30pm. The data on spot and future 3-month
interest rates are observed only at the daily frequency, so we use the change in daily quotes.
Since these quotes are taken at diﬀerent times for diﬀerent assets, the main issue is whether
we want the close from the day before to the day of the announcement or the change from the
day of to the day after. We measure U.S., U.K and German interest rates using the spot 3-
month eurodollar, spot 3-month sterling Libor and spot 3-month Fibor/Euribor deposit rates
respectively (mark and euro rates are spliced). These rates are directly comparable to each
other, the associated assets are very actively traded by international market participants,
7 Near the end of the month, this scaling factor is quite large. Unfortunately, our Fed Funds futures
rate data are recorded only to the nearest basis point (to the nearest half basis points since 1995). Thus,
our measured changes involve measurement error that is greatly exacerbated when the time-of-month scaling
factor is large. For this reason, we take the target surprise to be the change in the next month’s contract
whenever the change is after the 22nd of the month. Whenever the FOMC meeting occurs this late in the
month, there is no FOMC meeting the next month.
13and there are very well developed futures markets corresponding to each. We measure
expected future interest rates 3-months ahead and 6-months ahead using these eurodollar,
Libor and Fibor/Euribor futures contracts that trade in Chicago, London and Frankfurt,
respectively8. Our Eurodollar spot rate is the British Banker’s Association trimmed mean
of market quotes at 11am London time each day, well before the FOMC announcement. Libor
and Fibor/Euribor interest rate futures prices are closing prices in London and Frankfurt,
and these markets close before the FOMC announcement. Thus, for all these series we take
the change from the day of to the day after the announcement. The eurodollar futures prices
are taken at the Chicago close which is after the FOMC announcement. Thus, in this case,
we use the change from the day before to the day of the announcement.
3.3 Estimating the structural impulse responses
We run the regression of the changes in the spot 3-month interest rates, 3-month and 6-month
interest rate futures for the home and foreign country, and the exchange rate on the FFT
shock (the unexpected target rate change) for all of the 62 FOMC meetings from February
1994 to October 2001, inclusive. We then normalized the coeﬃcient on the spot U.S. interest
rate to -25 basis points, to get our estimate of structural impulse responses.9
The results, using the U.K. and Germany as the foreign countries are reported in Table
8These contracts all settle based on the spot eurodollar, Libor or Fibor/Euribor interest rate on the last
day of the contract. Liquid contracts exist settling in March, June, September and December of each year.
We use linear interpolation to compute the impl i e d3a n d6m o n t ha h e a df o recast interest rates.
9The Fed had a Federal Funds rate target before February 1994, but we use only data since February
1994 because we need to know the exact time at which the public learns of the FOMC target rate decision.
A public announcement has been made at 2:15pm since February 1994 only.
141. The coeﬃcients on the 3-month and 6-month ahead U.S. interest rates are negative and
highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on the spot and future interest rates are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for the U.K. The coeﬃcient on the 3-month ahead German interest rate is
signiﬁcantly negative and is about half the size of the 25 basis point decline in the spot U.S.
rate. The coeﬃcients on the spot and 6-month ahead German interest rates are negative and
borderline signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the exchange rate is positive (a surprise loosening
of monetary policy depreciates the dollar), and the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant for both the U.K.
and Germany. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are, in our view, quite reasonable. The
eﬀect on U.S. rates decays slightly over the 6 month horizon, but is nearly constant. The
identiﬁcation procedure takes these point estimates as the rjhs in (4). We take account of
uncertainty in these estimates using the conventional variance-covariance matrix. We next
combine these results with the VAR to gain identiﬁcation.10
4. Results on the identiﬁed VAR
In this section we apply the methodology to a benchmark 7-variable VAR of Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995). Our dataset consists of monthly observations from January 1974 through
October 2001. The variables are domestic and foreign output (y and y∗) measured as in-
d u s t r i a lp r o d u c t i o n ,U . S .p r i c e s( p) measured as the CPI, the three-month U.S. and foreign
interest rates (i and i∗) described above, the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves
10We assume there is no covariance between these estimates and the estimated VAR coeﬁcients discussed
in the next section. This assumption strikes us as reasonable.
15in the U.S. (nbrx) and the exchange rate (s) measured as the dollar price of foreign currency.
The two foreign countries are the United Kingdom and Germany. The details of the data
sources are in the data appendix. All of the variables, except the i and i∗ are in logs, and
the VAR includes 6 lags and a constant.
Eichenbaum and Evans (EE) estimate a recursive VAR with the data ordered as y, p,
y∗, i∗, nbrx, i, s, calling the shock in the NBRX equation the monetary policy shock. Figures
1 and 2 show the estimated impulse responses and 68% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals for
the recursive identiﬁcation, for both countries. The results are generally reasonable by the
standards of the literature and generally consistent with what EE ﬁnd using slightly diﬀerent
data and a sample ending in May 1990. The surprise 25 basis point loosening of U.S. policy
persists for about 6 months and then decays rapidly. The UK interest rate falls about half
as much but is more persistent. Home output rises gradually to a peak eﬀect of nearly a
percentage point after two years and then decays. Foreign output follows a similar pattern,
but at about half the magnitude. There is a “price puzzle” in that the home price level
initially falls signiﬁcantly following a monetary policy loosening. The exchange rate response
is quite diﬀerent from that in EE, however. It initially rises and then has a second mode at
a horizon of about 3 years. The German results show roughly the same pattern.
We are particularly interested in three questions concerning the exchange rate response:
i) What is the timing of the peak exchange rate eﬀect? ii) What share of the variance of
exchange rates is due to monetary policy shocks? (iii) Is the response to policy shocks
16consistent with uncovered interest rate parity (UIP)? These questions can all be motivated
by Dornbusch’s classic work on overshooting (1976). This model was designed to help explain
the high volatility of exchange rates relative to macroeconomic fundamentals. In Dornbusch-
style overshooting, the peak exchange rate eﬀect should come contemporaneously with the
shock, and the dynamics of the exchange rate are consistent with UIP.
With regard to the question of UIP, we know that UIP does not hold unconditionally
in the data. The deviation from UIP is interpreted as a time varying risk premium and
called the forward premium bias puzzle (see, e.g., Engel 1996). It remains conceptually
possible, however, that UIP holds conditionally in response to money shocks. In this case,
the monetary policy shock does not drive the variance of the risk premium or equivalently,
monetary policy shocks do not contribute to the forward premium bias. Most prior work
ﬁnds that conditional UIP does not hold.11
To assess this issue we calculate the implied root mean square UIP deviation (UIPD)
over 48 months following the money shock. The expected UIPD deviation at t+h of a shock
at t is given by,12
c(i,l) − c(i
∗,l) − 400[c(s,l +3 )− c(s,l)].
where c(x,l) is the response of variable x at lag l to the policy shock. The RMSE of the
11Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) report that
policy shocks generate deviations from UIP that are several times larger than the generated interest rate
diﬀerential. Cushman and Zha note that the pointwise coverage intervals on the the UIP deviations cover
zero, but do not report a joint statistic on the statistical signiﬁcance of the UIP deviations.
12This is annualized, presumes monthly data, and three-month interest rates in annual percentage rate
units.
17UIPD comes from summing the squared deviations over the 48 month horizon, and taking
t h es q u a r er o o to ft h i so bj e c t . 13 A large RMSE UIPD implies either large absolute deviations
or highly variable deviations, or both.
The top panel of Table 2 shows the estimates and 68% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
for various parameters relevant to answering our 3 questions: (i) the fraction of the variance
of exchange rates at horizons 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months that are due to the monetary
policy shock, (ii) the time of the peak eﬀect of the monetary policy shock on exchange rates
and (iii) the RMSE UIPD.
The EE model draws mixed conclusions at best regarding Dornbusch overshooting
as an explanation for exchange rate movements. For both countries and all horizons, the
conﬁdence interval for the variance share of the exchange rate accounted for by the policy
shock is 11 percent or less. The conﬁdence interval for the UK shows the peak exchange
rate eﬀect occurring more than two years after the shock; the German peak is much earlier.
Finally, for both countries the RMSE UIPD is quite large.
4.1 Results for the identiﬁed VAR
Remember that we can view the identiﬁcation problem as choosing a vector α and that the 7
elements of α g i v et h ei m p a c te ﬀect of the policy shock on the 7 variables in the VAR. The
element of α corresponding to the domestic interest rate is normalized to -0.25 (a surprise
13Some tricky timing and deﬁnition questions arise. We use monthly average data for exchange rates and
interest rates. If the identiﬁcation is correct, then the calculated UIP deviations should be interpreted as
the expected path of the monthly-average UIP deviation in response to a money shock.
1825 basis point easing). As discussed in section 2, we bound all other elements of α above
and below: we require that (i) the elements of α corresponding to p, y and y∗ are between
0 and 0.05, (ii) the element corresponding to i∗ is between -0.25 and 0, (iii) the element
corresponding to nbrx is between 0 and 0.25 and (iv) the element corresponding to s is
between 0 and 2.5. We therefore require that a surprise loosening of monetary policy cannot
lower output (foreign or domestic), prices, or NBRX contemporaneously, that it cannot cause
the dollar to appreciate contemporaneously and that it cannot cause foreign interest rates
to rise, contemporaneously.
Such assumptions are commonly applied either formally or informally in the literature
(e.g., Faust (1998)). We also set fairly weak bounds on the magnitude of these contempo-
raneous eﬀects. We think larger contemporaneous eﬀects are implausible. Recursive identi-
ﬁcations make the stronger restriction that there is no contemporaneous eﬀect on variables
such as output and prices that are higher in the ordering. While we view our restrictions as
quite reasonable, others may disagree. One of the nice features of our approach is that any
restrictions that are viewed as implausible may be loosened as much as one likes: the cost
of removing restrictions is simply wider conﬁdence intervals. We discuss some modiﬁcations
of this variety below.
We use the results from Table 1 to obtain an estimate of r with an associated variance-
covariance matrix. If the matrix R were of rank 7, then α w o u l db ej u s ti d e n t i ﬁed. We test
hypotheses about the rank of the matrix R using the method described in Appendix A2. We
19know that the matrix R has rank of at least 3, since one restriction normalizes the monetary
policy shock to lower interest rates by 25 basis points and the contemporaneous eﬀects of the
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates and foreign interest rates are also imposed. For
both countries, the hypotheses that R has rank 3 or 4 are clearly rejected (Table 3). The
hypotheses that it has rank 5 or 6 are not rejected. Thus α is not fully identiﬁed, and this
partial identiﬁcation means that we will not have any point estimates and must construct
conﬁdence intervals as described above.14
Figures 3 and 4 show pointwise conﬁdence intervals on the impulse response of the
variables in the system to the monetary policy shock.15 These are conservative conﬁdence
intervals in the sense that they will have coverage of at least 68% asymptotically. In these
conﬁdence intervals, we have substantially weakened the restrictions of the recursive identiﬁ-
cation, allowing simultaneity among all the variables. We have instead achieved identiﬁcation
with restrictions taken from the high frequency ﬁnancial market data and with the interval
restrictions on α.S i n c e w e e ﬀectively have only ﬁve identifying restrictions and the interval
restrictions on α, one might suppose that our conﬁdence intervals will be very wide. In
practice, our conﬁdence intervals are quite similar (both in width and shape) to those found
for the recursive identiﬁcation.
14An intuition for the rank deﬁciency is that the rows of R associated with the U.S. interest rate response
at horizons 3 and 6 are nearly proportional - using the notation in (4), B3:j is nearly proportional to B6:j
where the U.S. interest rate is the jth variable in the VAR. This is not surprising: similarly dated impulse
response estimates are typically highly collinear. The same argument holds for the foreign interest rate.
15As noted above, these take account of both uncertainty in our estimates of α and the reduced form
parameters.
20Part of the precision comes from our ap r i o r ibounds on α. This is necessary because
each impulse response is linear in α, which is unidentiﬁed in some directions, so that our
conﬁdence intervals for impulse responses will typically be unbounded otherwise. It is how-
ever natural to ask if the high frequency ﬁnancial data are contributing anything over and
above these bounds on α. We have re-done some of the results relying only on these bounds
on α,a n dﬁnd that the conﬁdence intervals are substantially wider16.
While the general character of the impulse response to the policy shock matches the
recursive identiﬁcation, there are some diﬀerences. For example, the eﬀect on output is
somewhat delayed and somewhat moderated relative to the recursive identiﬁcation. The
eﬀect of the U.S. policy shock on foreign output and interest rates lasts longer than with the
recursive identiﬁcation. The conﬁdence interval for prices is shifted up so that at no horizon
is there a pointwise signiﬁcant fall in prices following the policy loosening.
The conﬁdence intervals for the variance share of the exchange rate due to the policy
shock are considerably wider than those from the recursive identiﬁcation, going from about
0 to 30 percent (Table 2, bottom panel). But they are still considerably narrower than those
reported by Faust and Rogers (2002) who drop the strict recursiveness assumption but do
not use the ﬁnancial market data. Thus, while there are other diﬀerences among the three
approaches, it appears that the very small conﬁdence intervals in the top panel of Table 2
16The lag zero impulse responses are just the elements of α. For example, the upper bound on our
conﬁdence interval for the contemporaneous exchange rate eﬀect, incorporating high frequency ﬁnancial
data, is about 0.5 percent; our ap r i o r iupper bound for this parameter is 2.5 percent.
21rely on the strict recursiveness assumption. Dropping that, as in Faust and Rogers, leads
to the possibility that policy shocks are the main source of exchange rate variation. Adding
the restrictions implied by the ﬁnancial market data, reduces the maximal share to under
one-third.
Consistent with Faust and Rogers, we ﬁnd that the peak timing is not tightly identiﬁed.
Our conﬁdence interval goes from an immediate peak to a peak at a horizon over 5 years.17
Thus, the delayed overshooting found in EE seems to rely on strict recursiveness. For those
who ﬁnd strict recursiveness implausible, further information will have to be brought to bear
to further reduce our uncertainty on this point.
The recursive identiﬁcation, the approach of Faust and Rogers, and the new approach
in this paper concur that UIP deviations following money shocks are quite large. The
new identiﬁcation actually narrows the conﬁdence interval some relative to the recursive
identiﬁcation.
Recently, there has been some interest in the possibility that monetary policy loosenings
represent cost-shocks that could boost aggregate supply and lower prices in the short-run
(see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1997) and Barth and Ramey (2000)). In addition, it would be possible to argue that a
monetary policy loosening could cause the dollar to appreciate. In order to allow for these
possibilities we also considered relaxing our bounds on α to specify that the element of α
17Speciﬁcally, here we are referring to conﬁdence intervals on the lag time of the maximum impulse response
over lag horizons zero through 90.
22corresponding to p is between -0.05 and 0.05 and the element corresponding to s is between
-2.5 and 2.5. The results are very similar and our key conclusions emphasized above are not
altered by this modiﬁcation.18
4.2 Testing the validity of the recursive identiﬁcation
Our method drops some strong restrictions implied by the recursive identiﬁcation. The
beneﬁt is that we do not have to be concerned about robustness of our results to minor and
plausible changes in assumptions such as allowing small simultaneous interactions where
recursion imposes no response. The cost is that conﬁdence intervals for some items are quite
wide. Thus, it is worth checking whether the recursive identiﬁcation can be maintained in
the face of the information from ﬁnancial markets.
The α implied by the Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) recursive identiﬁcation is simply
the ﬁfth column of the Cholesky factor of the covariance matrix of the reduced form errors,
using their ordering of the variables (in which nbrx comes ﬁfth). For the UK this choice of α
is included in the conﬁdence set A, but for Germany it is not. In other words, the recursive
identiﬁcation is rejected by our identiﬁcation for Germany but not the UK (the p-values for
the test of Rα = r are 0.42 and 0.00 for the UK and Germany, respectively).19
18We have also re-run the original exercise but limiting the VAR estimation sample to begin in 1984:02, as
a stability check. Once again the results are quite similar. Note that since the high frequency data start in
1994, that portion of the estimation is unchanged when we estimate the VAR reduced form over the shorter
sample.
19We also tested the recursive ordering in which i∗ comes after nbrx;t h enbrx shock is still the policy
shock. This recursive ordering is not rejected for either country (p-values 0.40 and 0.94 for the UK and
Germany, respectively).
235. Support for the identifying assumptions
Our approach to identiﬁcation relies on the following principle assumptions.
1. The surprise change in the target rate on FOMC day is a monetary policy shock.
2. The change the interest rate future data give accurate measures of a change in the
expectation of future spot rates.
We take up these assumptions in this section.
5.1 Is the FOMC day surprise strictly due to a monetary policy shock?
There are two ways that this assumption could fail. First, other important information
could hit the market on the day of announced target changes. Second, the Fed’s decision on
FOMC day could reveal private information of the Fed about the state of the economy.
The issue of other important information hitting the market on the day of announced
target changes could be eﬀectively circumvented by using the change in the Fed Funds futures
price from 2:00pm to 2:30pm on FOMC day, instead of the daily close-to-close change. We
have intradaily data on the Fed Funds futures prices at 2:00pm and 2:30pm for the last 2
years of the sample only. The correlation between the change in the target surprise measured
using the 2:00pm-2:30pm intradaily data, and using the daily close-to-close data is 0.955.
This extremely high correlation would be surprising for other futures markets, but in the
case of the Fed Funds rate, we are dealing with a rate relatively tightly targeted by the
Federal Reserve. On FOMC days very little happens to change the expectation of this rate
over the remainder of the month except the FOMC announcement.
24Nonetheless, we checked whether any important pieces of macro data were announced
on the day of FOMC meetings. We ﬁnd that on the 62 FOMC days in our sample, durable
goods and GDP were released once each, PPI was released twice, industrial production was
released three times and CPI was released 5 times. There were no FOMC meeting days in
our sample on which retail sales were released. Deleting the FOMC days on which there is
one of these macro releases does not change the regression estimates in Table 1 by much.
The Federal Reserve might, however, have an information advantage through earlier
access to data (especially data that are produced by the Federal Reserve, such as industrial
production) or through superior economic analysis provided by the Fed’s staﬀ economists.
In short, the Fed announcement itself might eﬀectively release macroeconomic data. Faust,
Swanson and Wright (2002a, 2002b) test this hypothesis by regressing 9 macroeconomic
data releases on survey expectations for those data taken before the FOMC meeting, and
the FOMC-day target surprise measured from Federal Funds futures contracts. We ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on the target surprise is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent
level for any data release, and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for only 1 of the 9 releases
(industrial production). We interpret this as, at most, weak evidence against our assumption
that the Fed releases no macro information through the FOMC-day target surprise.
If the FOMC day surprise is strictly due to a monetary policy shock, we would expect
FOMC days to be special in some way. If the behavior of the Fed Funds futures price or its
association with other variables is not diﬀerent on these days than other days, it would be
25diﬃcult to argue that we are capturing a policy shock.
In recent years the unexpected component of the FOMC decision on the target rate,
measured from the futures market, is usually less than 10 basis points. Although this seems
like a small surprise, the standard deviation of the price of the same-month Federal Funds
contract is about 3 times larger on FOMC days than on non-FOMC days.20
I fw ea r ec a p t u r i n gt h er e s p o n s et oam o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k ,t h e nw ew o u l de x p e c t
the relative movements of asset prices around a macroeconomic data release, in response
to the unexpected component of that data release, to be quite diﬀerent from our estimated
response to policy shocks because macroeconomic data releases are not monetary policy
shocks. To investigate this, we regressed the change in the exchange rate from 8:15am
to 8:45am and the daily changes in spot interest rates and interest rate futures21 on the
surprise component of the non-farm payrolls release. This is a data release that comes out
at 8:30am Eastern time, and was found by Fleming and Remolona (1997) to be the most
important monthly macroeconomic release. The surprise component is measured as the
deviation between the actual non-farm payrolls data release and the Money Market Services
median forecast. We then computed the relative eﬀects of this shock, normalizing the eﬀect
on the spot U.S. interest rate to -25 basis points. The results are shown in Table 4, and are
20The FOMC-day standard deviation is 6 basis points, versus a non-FOMC-day standard deviation of 2.1
basis points. This does not necessarily mean that the monthly monetary policy shock in the VAR is small.
Again, our identiﬁcation assumes that the FFT is purely a monetary policy shock, not that it is the only
monetary policy shock.
21The spot and future interest rate series are the same as described in subsection 3.2.
26the direct analog of the results in Table 1, except using the unexpected components of the
non-farm payrolls data release instead of the unexpected component of the FOMC decision.
The relative movements of asset prices in response to the non-farm payrolls data release are
indeed quite diﬀerent from those in response to FOMC decision. In particular, the eﬀect of
the macroeconomic release on U.S. interest rates builds over time; the eﬀect at a 6-month
horizon is larger than at a 3-month horizon, which is larger than the contemporaneous eﬀect,
in contrast to the results in Table 1. Also, the eﬀects on the 6-month ahead expected future
interest rate in the United Kingdom, and on the sterling exchange rate, are much larger in
response to the non-farm payrolls release than in response to the FOMC decision.
5.2 Do the interest rate futures data accurately reﬂect expected future spot rates?
Eurodollar, libor and euromark/euribor futures all settle in the middle of March, June,
September and December. We assess the eﬃciency of the interest rate forecasts from each of
these markets as predictors of the actual interest rate on the settlement day22 1o r2q u a r t e r s
later by the standard forecast rationality regression. Speciﬁcally, we regress the forecast error
on a constant and the forecast interest rate If there is no time varying term premium, then
the slope coeﬃcient should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The results are reported in
Table 5. In all cases the hypothesis that the slope coeﬃcient is 0 is not rejected, so that we
can think of the term premia in interest rate futures as being time invariant.23
22This is implied by the settlement price of the contract.
23These ﬁndings are also consistent with Favero and Mosca’s (2001) results that the expectations theory
cannot be rejected in the post 1993 data.
27Interestingly, if we redo this exercise using the forecast of interest rates from the futures
market 4 or 8 quarters ahead, then the slope coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly below 0. This indicates
that the term premia vary over time, and may therefore be aﬀected by a monetary policy
shock. This, combined with the lower liquidity on longer dated contracts, are the reasons
w h yw ed on o tu s ef u t u r ei n t e r e s tr a t e sm o r et h a n6m o n t h sa h e a d .
6. Conclusions
Structural inference about the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates suﬀers
from the normal problems in identifying structural models and more. In the open economy
context one must sort out the simultaneous interaction of at least 3 ﬁnancial market variables:
home and foreign interest rates and the exchange rate. No recursive relation among these
variables is very plausible. Nonetheless, various recursive identiﬁcations have been proposed
and generally plausible answers have emerged from this work.
In this paper, we bring high frequency ﬁnancial market information to bear in identify-
ing the reaction of ﬁnancial market variables to a policy shock. Essentially, we require that
the impulse response of the VAR match the high frequency response of ﬁnancial market vari-
ables around the time of FOMC announcements. Using this new approach, we ﬁnd support
for the general characteristics of the impulse response of the system to policy shocks.
We ﬁnd this quite reassuring. We drop all recursiveness assumptions and use instead
very diﬀerent restrictions coming from ﬁnancial market data. The basic pattern of most of
28the responses is little changed in the face of large changes in the approach to identiﬁcation.
However, the eﬀect of the U.S. policy shock on foreign output and interest rates lasts longer
than with the recursive identiﬁcation. There is a price puzzle in the recursive identiﬁcation,
which is avoided with the new identiﬁcation. With speciﬁc regard to the exchange rate
response, our results are between those of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Faust and
Rogers (2002). We ﬁnd that the peak timing of the exchange rate eﬀect is quite imprecisely
estimated: it may come nearly immediately as in Dornbusch overshooting or come several
years later. The estimated variance share of exchange rate movements due to the policy
shock–bounded at about 1/3–is between the Eichenbaum-Evans and Faust-Rogers esti-
mates. Like both previous studies, we ﬁnd added support for the view that policy shocks
generate large UIP deviations.
Appendices
A1 Partial identiﬁcation
Here we describe how to construct the conﬁdence set A for the vector α when the restrictions
Rα = r must be satisﬁed, R is estimated by ˆ R, r is estimated by ˆ r, R m a yb er a n kd e ﬁcient,
T1/2(vec( ˆ R) − vec(R)) →d N(0,V R) and T1/2(ˆ r − r) →d N(0,V r). Consider the GMM
objective function
S(α)=T( ˆ Rα − r) [(α ⊗ IK)ˆ VR(α  ⊗ IK)+ˆ Vr]−1( ˆ Rα − r).
In standard GMM terminology, this is the continuous updating GMM objective function.
The estimator ˆ α that minimizes this objective function is not consistent for the true α
29because of the rank deﬁciency of the matrix R. However S(α0) has a χ2 null distribution
regardless of the rank of R where α0 denotes the true value of the vector α.D e ﬁne the
conﬁdence set
A = {αεA+ : S(α) ≤ Fχ2}
where Fχ2 denotes the 95th percentile of a χ2 distribution (degrees of freedom equal to the
number of elements in r)a n dA+ is our parameter space for α, each element of which is
constrained to lie between a lower bound and an upper bound.
The use of such conﬁd e n c es e t si nm o d e l st h a ta r en o tf u l l yi d e n t i ﬁed was proposed
by Stock and Wright (2000), where they are referred to as S-sets. If the matrix R is rank
deﬁcient, then there exists a subspace of vectors α that are observationally equivalent to α0.
Any vector in this subspace must be included in A with probability 95%, asymptotically.
Any other vector α will be excluded from A with probability 1, asymptotically. This is a
correct statement of what we do and do not know about α,w h e nR is rank deﬁcient. More
formally, the conﬁdence set A is unbounded with probability 0.95, asymptotically: this must
be the case for any conﬁdence set for an unidentiﬁed parameter if the conﬁdence set is to
have 95% asymptotic coverage uniformly in the parameter space (Dufour (1997)).
Concretely, we proceed by forming a grid with 20 million points in A+.F o r e a c h p o i n t
in this grid, we calculate the objective function S(α). I ft h i si sa b o v et h ec r i t i c a lv a l u e ,w e
compute nothing else and simply proceed to the next point in the grid. If the objective
function S(α) is below the critical value, we include that value of α in the conﬁdence set A.
For each such α, we then compute the lower and upper bounds of the bootstrap conﬁdence
30intervals for all the parameters of interest (notably variance shares and impulse responses)
conditional on that α. Each bootstrap replication involves calculating a new θ from the
bootstrap sample, while holding α ﬁxed - the conﬁdence interval then consists of the 100−v2
2
and 100+v2
2 percentiles of the parameters over a total of 500 bootstrap replications. Having
cycled through all points in the grid, our conﬁdence intervals for the objects of interest are
given by the smallest and largest values of these percentiles, respectively. This completes
the algorithm we use, for which MATLAB code is available from the authors, on request.
For each point α i nt h eg r i ds u c ht h a tS(α) is below the critical value, we have used the
Runkle (1987) bootstrap to form a conﬁdence interval for the parameters of interest, given
that θ is uncertain. We could instead take draws from the posterior for θ that corresponds
to the RATS prior and interpret the percentiles of this posterior as a classical conﬁdence
interval. This turns out to give similar results with the model and data considered in this
paper. Implementing the bias-adjusted bootstrap of Kilian (1998) pushes the largest root
of the VAR inside the unit circle except that Kilian’s algorithm then calls for the bias-
adjustment to be scaled back so as to induce a unit root but not an explosive root. We are
not aware of evidence that the bias-adjustment works well under these speciﬁc circumstances,
even though it too gives similar results except at long horizons. We accordingly report results
using just the bootstrap.
A2 Testing the rank of R
We wish to test the hypothesis that ρ(R)=L against the alternative that ρ(R) >L ,w h e r e
31ρ(.) denotes the rank of the argument. Assume that T1/2(ˆ θ−θ) →d N(0,V θ). See Hamilton
(1994) for primitive conditions for this convergence results and ˆ Vθ, a consistent estimator
of Vθ.T h e m a t r i x R is a nonlinear function of θ and can be estimated by ˆ R,w h e r et h i s
denotes this same nonlinear function of ˆ θ. By the delta method, T1/2(vec( ˆ R)−vec(R)) →d





To test the hypothesis about that rank of R, we use the test statistic
T minPεπ(L)(vec( ˆ R) − vec(P)) ˆ V
−1
R (vec( ˆ R) − vec(P))




dθ and π(L) is the space of all conformable matrices of rank L.B y
Theorem 1 of Cragg and Donald (1997), under the null hypothesis, this test statistic has a
χ2 null limiting distribution.
A3 Data
High frequency data. T h es p o ta n df u t u r e si n t e r e s tr a t ed a t aw e r ea c q u i r e df r o mD a t a s t r e a m
and CBOT and consist of daily closing prices, as described in the text. The exchange rate
data consist of 2pm and 2:30pm Eastern Time quotes (midpoint of bid and ask) obtained
from Olsen and Associates.
VAR data. The data were acquired from the Federal Reserve Board’s International Finance
and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) databases. All series are expressed
in natural logarithms except interest rates, which are expressed in percentage points. The
series deﬁnitions and as follows:
y (y∗) = index of U.S. (foreign) industrial production;
32p = U.S. CPI - all urban, all items;
nbr = non-borrowed reserves plus extended credit, seasonally adjusted, monthly average;
tr = total reserves, seasonally adjusted, monthly average;
nbrx = nbr/tr;
s = spot exchange rate; monthly average; US$/foreign currency;
i,i∗= for the U.S., 90-day T-bill rate, monthly average (line 60c, IFS); for the U.K., 90-day
T-bill rate, monthly average (line 60cs, IFS), for Germany, 90-day Fibor/Euribor rate.
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36Table 1: Measures of the impulse response to a policy shock
UK VAR German VAR
variable horizon rel. response st. error rel. response st. error
i 0- 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 2 5
3 -0.233 0.042 -0.233 0.042
6 -0.206 0.060 -0.206 0.060
i∗ 0 0.028 0.071 -0.040 0.022
3 -0.016 0.076 -0.113 0.043
6 -0.016 0.089 -0.127 0.067
s 0 0.352 0.156 0.611 0.271
Notes: The results are for a least squares regression of the change in the spot/future in-
terest rate or exchange rate on the unexpected change in the target Federal Funds rate,
with no intercept, around the FOMC meeting. The coeﬃcient on the spot U.S. interest
rate is normalized to -25 basis points. There are 62 observations; the standard errors are
conventional OLS standard errors using the delta method to adjust for the normalization.Table 2: Summary of the response of the exchange rate to the monetary policy shock
variance share at horizon
12 24 36 48 60 Peak time UIPD
Recursive Identiﬁcation
UK pt. est. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1 0.45
UK CI 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 30 34 0.47 0.98
Germany pt. est. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 1 0.47
G e r m a n y C I 0 . 0 10 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 0 60 . 0 10 . 0 70 . 0 10 . 0 80 . 0 10 . 0 9 1 1 0 . 4 71 . 0 5
new identiﬁcation
UK CI 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.26 0 64 0.34 0.99
G e r m a n y C I 0 . 0 00 . 3 40 . 0 10 . 3 10 . 0 10 . 3 30 . 0 20 . 3 40 . 0 20 . 3 3 1 6 7 0 . 3 1 0 . 9 6
Notes: The conﬁdence intervals are 68 conservative percent bootstrap intervals as discussed
in the text. The peak time and variance share horizons are in months. UIPD is the root
mean square UIP deviation at horizon 48.Table 3: Test of the rank of R in Rα = r, test statistic and (p-value)
Null UK Germany
ρ = 3 226.62 244.86
(0.00) (0.00)
ρ = 4 98.45 108.54
(0.00) (0.00)
ρ = 5 11.48 8.54
(0.32) (0.58)
ρ = 6 1.40 1.19
(0.84) (0.88)
Notes: See Appendix A2 for details on this test.Table 4: Measures of the impulse response to the Non-Farm Payrolls data surprise
US-UK data US-German data
variable horizon rel. response st. error rel. response st. error
i 0- 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 2 5
3 -0.463 0.058 -0.463 0.058
6 -0.647 0.088 -0.647 0.088
i∗ 0 0.036 0.057 0.003 0.028
3 -0.176 0.057 -0.094 0.029
6 -0.263 0.077 -0.135 0.043
s 0 0.641 0.181 0.121 0.273
Notes: The results are for a least squares regression of the change in the spot/future interest
rate or exchange rate on the unexpected component of the non-farm payrolls data release,
with no intercept, around the data release time. For the US-UK and US-German data,
the home country is the US and the foreign country is the UK and Germany, respectively.
The coeﬃcient on the spot U.S. interest rate is normalized to -25 basis points. There are
62 observations; the standard errors are conventional OLS standard errors using the delta
method to adjust for the normalization.Table 5: Forecast eﬃciency tests for interest rate futures
ˆ α ˆ β
Eurodollar -0.16 -0.01
1 quarter ahead (0.52) (0.90)
Eurodollar 0.00 -0.08
2 quarters ahead (1.00) (0.51)
Sterling LIBOR -0.08 0.00
1 quarter ahead (0.94) (0.97)
Sterling LIBOR -0.53 0.04
2 quarters ahead (0.37) (0.55)
Euribor -0.12 0.02
1 quarter ahead (0.32) (0.37)
Euribor -0.40 0.06
2 quarters ahead (0.14) (0.19)
Notes: These results refer to the standard eﬃciency test evaluating the forecast of 1 and 2
quarter ahead spot interest rates implicit in interest rate futures markets. The forecast error
is regressed on a constant and the forecast. There are four observations per year, correspond-
ing to the settlement days of the interest rate futures contracts. The p-values associated
with coeﬃcient estimates are shown in parentheses. For one-quarter ahead forecasts, con-
ventional OLS standard errors are used. For two-quarter ahead forecasts, Hansen-Hodrick


























































































































































Effect on SFig. 3: New Identification Confidence Intervals for UK Impulse Responses







































Effect on SFig. 4: New Identification Confidence Intervals for German Impulse Responses
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